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IMAGES, SPIRITUALITY, AND ,LAW 
Richard Stith • 
Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness . 
• 
· - Genesis 1 :26 
[T]he honor which is paid to the image passes on to that which the 
image represents, and he who reveres the image reveres in it the 
person who is represented. 
- Seventh Ecumenical Council (Nicea II, 787)1 
Technological consciousness and libertarian doctrine reduce the 
material world to an instrument or better, to an amorphous resource 
existing solely for those ends ·which we freely choose.2 We are 
. . 
trapped in matter without true form or meaning. 
Even for the Christian, such reduction has grave consequences. 
God resides in a distant heaven or in a distant time. Only after years 
of exile in a nature bereft of divinity can we hope, perhaps, to be re-
warded with bodily salvation in a different universe. In the meantime, 
any spirituality we hold to must be necessarily non-material-
founded in. a dualistic belief in the presence of the intangible Deity 
whispering to our own intangible selves. We are put asunder, into 
godless brains and disembodied souls. 
Merely romantic protest against this state of affairs is not 
enough. We cannot wish our way out of the only world we think is 
real, for we know that in so doing we are only pretending, playing at 
believing. We cannot live in the world, say, of a Native American or 
of a Hindu simply because we think we might benefit from pantheistic 
beliefs. If we knowingly reduce truth to "what is good for us to be-
• J.D., Ph.D~ Professor of Law, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana. This arti-
cle also appears in Andriy M. Chirosky, ed., Following the Star from the East: Essays in Hon-
our of Archimandrite Boniface Luykx, 120-35 (The Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky Institute 
of Eastern Christian Studies, Ottawa, 1992). 
1. Constantine Cavarnos, Concerning the Holy Icons, in Orthodox Iconography Appendix 
A, 54 (Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Belmont, Mass, 1977). I have here 
substituted the word "image" where Cavamos has "icon." 
2. See Josef Pieper, The Philosophical Act, in Leisure, the Basis for Culture, translated by 
,Alexander Dru, 69-125, especially at 81 (Pantheon-Random House, 1963); and Martin 
Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt, 3-35 (Harper and Row, 1977). In a similar vein, 
but with explicit discussion of Christian icons (from a non-Christian point of view), see Theo· 
dore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends 109-41 (Doubleday, 1972). 
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lieve,"3 it becomes fake and loses its power to do good for us. We 
need not less truth and reality, but more. 
The icon (from the Greek eikon, meaning "image") offers us a 
way out, a way to reconnect the body (and matter itself) with spirit.-
a way actually to see God with our human eyes in this passing life. 
Eastern Christianity contains a nearly forgotten way to define what is 
real, a definition understood not as poetic pretense but as objective 
truth. Moreover, this ancient way of seeing seems inextricably part of 
Scripture and Tradition, and therefore to have the assurance of reve-
lation behind it. 
Beginning with the understanding of icons developed in the 
eighth and ninth centuries in the Near East, this essay will show that 
the iconic theory of reality permeates Eastern Christian spirituality. 
Finally, contemporary legal thought will be analyzed, for it is espe-
cially in law that today's great battle between image-based realism 
and instrumental nominalism is taking place. 
I. THE DIGNITY OF ICONS 
. 
On one point the iconoclasts (literally, "icon-breakers") of the 
eighth century agreed with the later-held orthodox iconodules ("icon-
venerators"): a perfect image (or copy) is essentially identical to its 
prototype (or original).4 So St. Theodore the Studite (759-826) writes 
in his defense of icon veneration: "If (the image is] ... wholly similar 
[to the prototype] ... the image is simply the prototype. " 5 
This assumption, non-controversial even between these bitter op-
ponents, may at first hearing surprise us moderns. For even a perfect 
copy is separated from its original by time and space; it was made 
after the original and stands in a location different from that of the 
original. Few among us would say, even of a perfect reproduction of 
a painting, "That is now the original" or "Neither of these can be 
considered only a copy" or "These two are really one and the same." 
3. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 176 (Princeton University Press, 
1979). 
4. This element of agreement is obscured by disagreements between opponents and sup-
porters of icons on how to describe this state of perfect identity. See Jaroslav Pelikan, The 
Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700) 109, 113 (University of Chicago, 1974). For a gen-
eral critical history of the iconoclast struggles, see Hans-Georg Beck, The Greek Church in the 
Epoch of Iconoclasm, in Friedrich Kempf et al, The Church in the Age of Feudalism~ in 3 
Hubert Jedin & John Dolan eds, Handbook of Church History 26-53 (Herder and Herder, 
1969). 
5. St. Theodore the Studite, On the Holy Icons, translated by Catherine P. Roth, 111 (St. 
Vladimir's Seminary .Press, 1981 ). 
• 
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To declare that the image is the prototype is to think of reality as 
wholly a matter of form, to be oblivious to spatial and temporal sepa-
ration. Yet is St. Theodore's idea foreign to our ears or only to our 
minds? Perhaps modem metaphysical dogmas prevent us from un .. 
derstanding not only the wisdom of past ages but even the phenome-
nological worlds in which we still live. Here, as elsew.here, pseudo-
scientific doctrines may keep us from thinking clearly .about that 
which we already know. 
' I recall a science fiction story read many years ago. It seems that 
a "copy-a-person" chemistry set had by accident come from the fu-
ture to Smith's basement. Smith successfully proceeded to make a 
perfect, living image of himself. The copy was so exact and complete 
that it shared Smith's· every affection and memory. Unfortunately, at 
that moment the chemistry set owner appeared and demanded to 
have all of his chemicals back. Of course, both Smiths claimed, sin-
cerely, to be the true original, so the owner just took one Smith at 
random and dissolved him back into his components. 
Was tl1ere not a deep truth in the claim of Smith's perfect image 
to be Smitlt? To insist upon location and timing to define him as a 
mere copy would seem myopic. One's identity and dignity should not 
depend upon accidents of space and time~ 
If this example is too fanciful, suppose that we could ·make a 
flawless copy of a videocassette tape. Would we not treat both tapes 
as iden~ical in being?6 Or suppose that a group of Americans_ decides 
to learn Israeli folk dancing or Chinese cooking. As they practice and 
learn; we might tend to call the results mere "imitations" of the origi-
nals. But if they achieve mastery, could ·we not say '·'This is Israeli 
folk dancing" and ''This is Chinese cooking?"' And we could state 
further that they know the dancing and the cooking in a far more 
complete way than others who might have journeyed across conti~ 
nents to behold the originals. Thus, at least in certain contexts, we do 
recognize that form may be identical to being and, therefore, that an 
image may equal a prototype, without regard to space-time separa-
tion. A perfect .representation is a re-presentation,-making the origi-
nal present again" 
Now a painted icon is never perfectly or essentially the same as 
its prototype, be_ that prototype Christ, the Virgin, or some saint. On 
6. Perhaps our problem with the painting above was simply that we_ could not conceive 
of a perfect copy . 
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this the orthodox fathers are clear. 7 But would it not be correct, nev-
ertheless, to say that the icon shares some of the being, and thus some 
of the dignity, of the original? Yes, says St. Theodore: "[e]ven if we 
grant that the image does not have the same form as the prototype 
. . . , veneration is given to the image ·~ . . insofar as it resembles the 
prototype.''8 For "that which is similar in some degree to another 
thing shares its veneration to the degree in which it is similar."9 And 
again he explains, even though an icon of Christ is not God, "if one 
says that divinity is in the icon, he would not be wrong." 10 The na-
ture of the icon, perhaps wood and paint, is fundamentally different 
from the divine and human natures of Christ, but since the icon 
shares His personal forn1 to a degree, it also shares to that degree in 
His being and dignity. 11 
We moderns may wonder how an imperfect image of a person 
(especially one on mere paper or wood) could be said to share being 
with the original. Yet might we not find ourselves kissing the photo-
graph of a distant and beloved spouse? Surely, this is done not be-
cause one loves a piece of photographic paper, but because of the 
beloved therein depicted. The photo contains, in some sense we can-
not easily explain, a bit of "Jane-ness" or "John-ness." (So would a 
letter or some intimate keepsake, by the way. Relics and icons are 
closely related. 12) It is that bit of the spouse's being which is trea-
7. ld at 31, 102. See also St. John of Damascus, On the Divine Images 19 (St. Vladimir's 
Seminary Press, 1980); and Leonide Ouspensky, The Meaning and Language of Icons, in Leo-
nide Ouspensky and Vladimir Lossky, The Meaning of Icons, translated by G.E.H. Palmer and 
E. Kadloubovsky, 32, note 4 (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1989). 
8. St. Theodore, Holy Icons at 104 (cited in note 5). As far as I have been able to 
discover, even the most extreme iconoclasts, who had every motive for undermining all con-
nection between copy and original, did not claim that the eighth century icons at issue bore no 
resemblance to Christ or to the saints. 
9. ld at 107. 
10. ld at 33. 
11. ld at 103, 107. Vladimir Lossky has reemphasized more recently that an "icon or a 
cross does not exist simply to direct our imagination during our prayers. It is a material centre 
in which there reposes an energy, a divine force, which unites itself to human art." Vladimir 
Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, translated from the French, 189 
(Clarke, 1957). Even between iconoclasts and iconodules, it was non-controversial .. that mate-
rial objects can be the seat of divine power and that this power can be secured through physical 
contact with a sacred object." Pelikan, Eastern Christendom at 93 (cited in note 4), quoting 
Paul J. Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople 5 (Oxford, 1958). Thus the 
form of the Cross was venerated even by the iconoclasts. Pelikan, Eastern Christendom at 110 
(cited in note 4). Later Protestant iconoclasm seems to have been unsympathetic to, or even 
unaware of, such incamational assumptions. Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends at 124-31 
(cited in note 2). 
12. St. John of Damascus treats the holiness of saints' bodies and bones as analogous to 
the holiness of painted icons. St. John, Divine Images at 27, 42 (cited in note 7). (Ouspensky 
cites him approvingly on this point. Ouspensky, The Meaning of Icons at 44 (cited in note 7). 
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sured and kissed. 
The last, and perhaps most striking, component of the ontology 
underlying icons is the unity of image and prototype. It is not only 
that copy and original share being but that they are united by that 
being._ Put another way, the imperfect copy is an extension of the 
being of the original., St. Theodore argues that "prototype and image 
. . . 
are one in hypostatic likeness, but two in nature: one entity is not 
split into two likenesses, so as thereafter to have no participation or 
relation with each other .... " 13 Because of this communion, 14 the· 
Seventh Ec·umenical Council (Nicea II, 787) was able to affirm that 
"the honor which is paid to the icon passes on to that which the icon 
represents, and he who reveres the icon reveres in it the person who is 
represented.'' 15 
Here the Council echoes the oft-cited words of St. Basil the 
Great: 
The image of the emperor is also called the emperor, yet there are 
. ' 
not two emperors.. Power is not divided, nor is_ glory separated. 
Just as he who rules us is one power, so the homage he receives 
from us is united not divided, for the homage given to the image is 
transferred to the prototype.16 
St. John Chrysostom had likewise been cite_d by the iconodules with 
regard to the participation of image and prototype in dishonor as well 
as honor: 
Do you not know that if you insult the image of the emperor, you 
transfer the insult to the prototype? Do you not know that if you 
show contempt to his image, whether it is a wooden carving or a 
copper statue, you will be judged not for insulting lifeless matter, 
but for showing the emperor contempt? Dishonor shown to the 
Fully to describe the theory of being held by these Christian centuries would require (in my 
opinion) an explanation of bow a person is present at least in all that is "'proper" to him or her, 
not only in his or her image. Furthermore, in order fully to comprehend the sanctity even of 
icons, one should be aware of the various ways, in addition to form, in which painted icons are 
related to their prototypes. For example, in Eastern practice prayer is offered during the writ-
ing of an icon, and the icon is afterwards solemnly blessed. Also very important is the fact that 
the icon bears the proper name of the prototype. St. Theodore says that a name is "a sort of 
natural image of that to which it is applied.'j St. Theodore~ Holy Icons at 35 (cited in note 5). 
13. St. Th€~odore, Holy Icons at 108 (cited in note 5). 
14. "Communion" is the word used for this relation of image to prototype by Ouspensky. 
Ouspensky; The Meaning of Icons at 36 (cited in note 7). 
15. Translated in Cavamos, Orthodox Iconography at 54 (cited in note 1). DanielSahas 
renders it " '[T]he honour to the icon is conveyed to the prototype'. Thus, he who venerates 
the icon venerates the hypostasis of the person depicted on it., Daniel Sahas, Icon and Logos.~ 
Sources in .Eighth Century Iconoclasm 119 (U Toronto Press, 1986). 
16. Quoting St. John of Damascus~ Divine Images at 36 (cited in note 7). 
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emperor's image is dishonor shown to the emperor himself. 17 
To take such assertions realistically (as they seem intended), 
rather than merely psychologically, clearly presupposes a supersen-
sual world beyond space and time. Without temporal and spatial dis-
tance, an image and an original would indeed flow together and be no 
longer distinguishable. A Platonist might here invoke the world of 
pure Forms, of which all particulars are mere emanations and partici-
pations. A Christian could look to God and the Word sub specie 
ae_ternitatis, or to the medium provided by the ever-present Holy 
Spirit. 18 And there are no doubt other metaphysical fortnulations 
which could attempt to make sense of the iconic teachings we have 
been examining. We need not choose any one of them here. 
Can this union also make phenomenological sense to modem 
people, obsessed as we are with subjective experience? For it is clear 
that the emperor does not experience honor or dishonor at the mo-
ment his distant image is treated with homage or contempt. Yet, 
when he later discovers what was done to his image, will he not feel 
that he gained or lost at that earlier time rather than at the moment of 
discovery? If my beloved tells me that she carried my photograph in 
her bosom for the entire year I was away, does not that year stand 
revealed now as having been already a shared, though hidden, relation 
of love? Perhaps our limitation is not one of being but of conscious-
ness a defect not present for the divinely omniscient persons repre-
sented in Christian icons. 
II. IMAGES AND SPIRITUALITY 
The authoritative theory of icons we have so far examined did 
not spring full blown ex nihilo. It arose from Scripture and from Tra-
dition, as developed especially in the great trinitarian and christologi-
cal councils, 19 as well as from the wider spiritual consciousness within 
17. ld at 68. 
18. Ouspensky states that "it is the grace of the Holy Spirit which sustains the holiness 
both of the represented person and of his icon .... The icon participates in the holiness of its 
prototype and, through the icon, we in turn participate in this holiness in our prayers." Leo-
n ide Ouspensky, Theology of the I con 191 (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 197 8). 
19. Daniel Sahas may be incorrect in asserting that "the first Byzantine Emperor to take 
an official position against the icons was Leo III the !saurian" in the eighth century. Sahas, 
I con and Logos at 24 (cited in note 15). Prohibition of icons had already occurred in a decree 
of the Emperors Theodosius and Valentinian in the year 427, stating "As it is Our diligent care 
to guard in every way the religion of the Celestial Divinity, we specially command that no one 
shall be permitted to trace, carve, or paint the image of Christ the Saviour either upon the 
earth, upon stone, or upon marble placed in the earth, but it shall be erased wherever found 
.... " Title VIII, Book I, The Code of Justinian, translated by Samuel P. Scott, 3 The Civil 
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which they were embedded. 20 But here we shall reverse that order: 
the theory of icons will now be used to illuminate Scripture and 
spirituality. 
Icon or image theory is fundamental to Eastern Christianity.21 
Without the help of icon doctrine, it is difficult to discern a trinitarian 
meaning in many passages of Scripture. For example, Colossians 1:15 
states that Christ is the "image" (in Greek, "eikon'') of the invisible 
God. Hebrews 1:3 refers, again, to Christ as the "exact representa-
tion" or "perfect copy" of the Father's "nature'' or "being." Only if a 
perfect image is one in being with its prototype can one easily read 
these verses to indicate Christ's co-divinity, or hartnonize them with 
His own statement that "He who has seen Me has seen the Father" 
(John 14:9). The distinction between the Son and the Father, namely, 
that the Son is begotten, is itself a confirmation of identity of being, 
for a son \Vas understood to be the "natural image"22 of his father, 
and thus to share with him an inner essence as well as the outer form 
shared by an artificially made image. So it is that without hesitation 
St. Theodore moves back and forth analogically between the nature of 
icons and the nature of the Trinity itself: 
Law 74-75 (The Central Trust Company, 1932). The important word here may be "earth., 
The decree may be not so much anti-image as anti-matter, concerned to safeguard spiritual 
fornt from material interpolation. It is striking that this iconoclast edict occurred almost on 
the eve of the <:ouncil of Ephesus ( 431 ), the incamational doctrines of which were later to play 
such an important role in St. Theodore's defense of icons. St. Theodore, Holy Icons at 85-87, 
90-91 (cited in note 5). God could no longer be regarded as wholly "celestial" after that 
council, because His eternal Son and Mary's Child, brought forth from her womb one day in 
Bethlehem, were then known to be one and the same Person or Hypostasis, and so divinity 
could be represented by an earthly and sensible image. (However, note that the Emperor 
Justinian reaffirmed this iconoclast decree long after Ephesus, in the above-cited codification.). 
20. See, for example, the influence of the mystery religions, described by Alexander 
Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology, translated from the Russian by Asheleigh E. 
Moorhouse, 85 (The Faith Press St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1966). Pelikan has empha-
sized the impact of the neo-platonic philosophy of the Pseudo-Dionysius. Pelikan, Eastern 
Christendom at 120 (cited in note 4). Indeed, for the Greek and the Hellenistic world in gen-
eral the image is "an emanation, ... a revelation of the being with a substantial participation 
... in the object .... It has a share in the reality. Indeed, it is the reality.u Hertnann 
Kleinknecht, in Gerhard Kittel ed, 2 Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, translated 
by Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 389 (Eerdmans, 1964). 
21. Ouspensky has written that "in the conscience of the Church the Divine dispensation 
is organically connected with the image. Therefore the doctrine relating to the image is not 
something separate, not an appendix, but follows naturally from the doctrine of salvation, of 
which it is an inalienable part." Ouspensky, The Meaning of Icons at 28 (cited in note 7). I am 
by no means suggesting that the same or a similar theory did not inform the New Testament 
authors themselves. According to Kittel, "in the NT the original is always present in the 
image." Kittel ed, Theological Dictionary at 395 (cited in note 20). 
22. St. John, Divine Images at 74 (cited in note 7). Kittel states that "the being of Jesus as 
image is only another way of talking about . His being as the Son." Kittel ed, Theological 
Dictionary at 389 (cited in note 20). 
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If the fact that the Son differs in some respect from the Father (He 
differs only in the property of sonship) does not prevent Him from 
having the same essence and veneration as the Father, then the fact 
that the image differs in some respect from the prototype (it differs 
in respect to the principle of its essence) will not prevent it from 
having the same likeness and veneration as its prototype. Just as 
Christ is distinguished from the Father by His hypostasis, so He is 
distinguished from His image by His essence. 23 
The theory of imaging we have examined is also foundational in 
the East for an understanding of human and Christian dignity. What 
is the point of the Genesis saying that man is made in the "image" of 
God? Is it not that man therefore has great dignity, a conclusion that 
makes sense only if we assume with St. Theodore that similarity in 
form demands similarity in veneration?24 
Christians are called to a still greater imaging. By becoming like 
Christ, who is Himself the natural image of the Father, we become 
His "true images" (Romans 8:29). We even become God's "children" 
(I John 3:1), that is to say (unlike a wooden icon) we come to share to 
some degree in God's very nature. 25 We are ''born'' of God. (I John 
3:9, 4:7). St. Gregory of Nazianzus strongly recalls for us the genuine 
veneration and reverence due to the human icon: 
If after baptism the persecutor and tempter of the light assail you 
... rely on the seal and say to him ul myself am the image of God; 
. . . I have put on Christ; I have been transformed into Christ by 
baptism; you must worship me!26 
Icon theory likewise sheds light on St. Matthew's depiction of the 
Last Judgment. When Christ says "whatsoever you did to the least of 
My brothers, that you did unto Me'' (Matthew 25:40), He may not be 
speaking just metaphorically of His affection for human beings. He 
may be stating a real truth clear to those who know that honor and 
dishonor pass from image to prototype because they are one in being. 
His brothers share His natural image and, therefore, to do something 
to them is in full reality to do it also to Him. 
In the East the idea of sanctification, too, is founded on imaging. 
23. St. Theodore, Holy Icons at 105 (cited in note 5). 
24. Image theory can also explain human dignity in another way. When Christ took on 
human flesh, He united Himself indirectly with all other examples (images) of that flesh. "He 
has deified our ftesh forever, and has sanctified us by surrendering His Godhead to our flesh 
without confusion." St. John, Divine Images at 29 (cited in note 7). 
25. But we do so without losing our own human nature. St. John of Damascus suggests 
that a saint participates in divinity as a red-hot iron participates in fire. St. John, Divine 
Images at 27, 84-85 (cited in note 7). 
26. Id at 102-03. 
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To be a upartaker in the divine nature" (II Peter 1:4), is to become 
"deified," t<) become like God, to take on ever more fully the Divine 
Likeness, and thus to share Divine Being itself.. And it is only by 
becoming an icon of God that we can come to partake of His nature. 
St. Anthony the Great put the matter concisely: "Through likeness to 
God we become united with God; through unlikeness we become sep-
arated. " 27 We cannot know Him, we cannot be in union with Him, 
unless we are like Him in His nature above all in love. The teaching 
"[t]he one who does not love .does not know God, for God is love" (I 
John 4:8) means that there is no other way to intimacy with God 
except by becoming what He is, i.e., love. 
Among the other ways that Scripture gives us to image God, and 
thus to have God abide in us, are confession of Christ as Son of God 
(I John 4:15), hope in Him (I John 3:3), and especially "seeing'' Him: 
I John 3:2 states that "we shall be like Him because we shall see Him 
just as He is," reflecting the age-old understanding that to see (and, 
even more, to know) is to image the seen in one's own being.28 
For purposes of this essay, one way for humankind to image Go-d 
must receive special emphasis: the fulfillment of the law. Contrary to 
much Protestant29 and liberal thought, the Catholic and Orthodox 
traditions hold law to be not a necessary evil but a positive good. Sin, 
in fact, is defined as "lawlessness'' (I John 3:4). And Christ is Himself 
the fulfillment of the Old L~w. He who keeps Christ's command-
ments has <~hrist abiding in Him (I John 3,:24), meaning that Christ's 
commands or laws are part of His nature. As the medieval German 
Sachsenspiege/ put it: "God is Himself law, and therefore law is dear 
to Him~"30 Through God's grace, we become like Him by embodying 
those virtues which enable us ever more fully to comply with His 
law.31 This idea of law as a revered reality to be reflected in our lives, 
and-of the reflection participating in the reality, is one of the last great 
remnants of iconic thought to s,urvive in the modern world (though it 
is hard-pressed as we shall see below). 
Fully to develop the significance of icon theory would require a 
27. Quoted by Cavamos, Orthodox Iconography at 47 (cited in note 1). 
28. ld. See also, for example, Pieper, The Philosophical Act at 88 (cited in note 2). 
29. See Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision 141-64 (Little, Brown, 1960) on Luther's 
reduction of law from an end in itself to a civil and theological instrument . 
.30. Quoted by Harold Berman (in a 1988 presentation to the Center on Religion ,and 
Society) from Karl August Eckhardt ed, Sachenspiegel V.· Landrecht in Hochdeutscher Uber-
tragung pro log ( 1967). 
31. Cavarnos, Orthodox Iconography at 41 (cited in note 1 ). 
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much lengthier essay. 32 At the least, we would have to touch upon 
the Eastern Orthodox ecclesiology that is based on shared recognition 
of one's image in sister Churches, upon Hebrew and Greek concepts 
of remembrance, 33 upon sacramento logy and ex opere opera to, upon 
the use of relics and images to make holy even unseen recesses of 
Romanesque and Gothic churches, upon the truly marvelous ability 
of the Fathers and of the Middle Ages to find in numbers and in na-
ture countless hidden images of the divine, 34 and especially upon the 
broad doctrine that natural things are images of prototypes found in 
the Logos, and thus can be more or less "true. " 35 Such ideas cannot 
fail deeply to impress the human spirit. 
Most importantly, image theory lies at the very center of the Di-
vine Liturgy or Mass. Because of the real presence36 of Christ in the 
consecrated Bread and Wine (the Divine Prototype being fully present 
in very essence or substance), the congregation is able to be "images 
of the cherubim," singing the thrice-holy hymn directly before Christ 
in His suffering and in His glory. By means of a true unity of being 
with past, future, and eternal events, those present for the Liturgy 
partake already of heavenly bliss. The liturgy, like the painted icon, 
transcends space and time to extend the Incarnation and Redemption 
through all ages of ages. 37 Only when Christians no longer under-
stand the unity of image with prototype can they come to think of the 
Mass as a mere repetition of past saving events (and thus perhaps to 
question its necessity). 
32. Pelikan calls icon doctrine the very "melody of theology," citing Nicephorus. Pe-
likan, Eastern Christendom at 133 (cited in note 4). 
33. On anamnesis, see Lossky, Mystical Theology (cited in note 11). 
34. See here Emile Male's classic work, The Gothic Image: Religious Art in France in the 
Thirteenth Century, translated by Dora Nussey (Harper and Row, 1913, 1958). Male quotes 
Adam of St. Victor (who in tum was echoing St. Augustine) saying: "What is a nut if not the 
image of Jesus Christ? The green and fleshy sheath is His ftesh, His humanity. The wood of 
the shell is the wood of the Cross on which that flesh suffered. But the kernel of the nut from 
which men gain nourishment is His hidden divinity." ld at 30. After other examples, Male 
adds: "Never was a doctrine more closely knit or more universally accepted. It dates back to 
the beginning of the Church, and is founded on the words of the Bible itself. In the Scriptures, 
indeed, as interpreted by the Fathers, the material world is a constant image of the spiritual 
world." Id at 31. 
35. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1-11, Q 93, Art. 1, ob 3, asserts that a thing 
contains truth in so far as it resembles the divine intellect. 
36. Both iconoclasts and iconodules taught the real presence of the Body and Blood of 
Christ. Pelikan, Eastern Christendom at 93-94 (cited in note 4). 
37. For a beautiful exposition of the transtemporal character of the Liturgy, see Constan-
tine Kalokyris, The Essence of Orthodox Iconography, translated by Peter Chamberas, 85-87 
(Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1985). 
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Ill. IMAGES AND LAW 
Rule-governed conduct is iconic. The individual actor seeks to 
emulate the prototypical behavior laid down in the law, and the indi-
vidual application is treated as participating in the reality and dignity 
of the general rule. We say that to "con-form'' to the law is to be 
"law-abiding" and "law-ful." Moreover, to fail to image the law is to 
"break" it. Honor or dishonor in the particular instance passes on to 
the general law, just as St. Basil and St. John Chrysostom pointed out 
the dishon<>r to the emperor of the slight to his image . 
• 
" On another level, too, legal theory is icon theory. Once a princi-
ple exists in the law, judges tend to apply it to all factual instances 
which image the factual prerequisites found in statutes or prior cases. 
Each image acquires dignity from the principle regardless of any tem-
poral or spatial separation between the two, and largely regardless of 
any consequences which the judge ·may find unappealing. 
Sometimes analogical as well as deductive ·reasoning is needed in 
order to discover and. to apply rules. Here the judge;s first task is to 
discern the hidden prototype to be found in a mass of prior p.articu-
lars, before he or she can .apply it to ·a new case. But both types of 
reasoning are called uforrnal" (or, by· their myriad detractors, "for-
malistic'') because they find their meaning and justification in the imi-
tation of honored forms rather than in an instrumental calculus of 
space-time consequences. 
·St~ Thomas Aquinas has provided a metaphysical and theological 
way to understand the iconic· basis of legal thought. He teaches that 
the eternal law is a part of the very being of God, rather than some-
thing merely willed by Him for arbitrary or contingent reasons. 38 
Natural law is a participation in eternal law, and therefore to image 
the naturally right is to come closer to identity and union with God~ 
Of course, Aquinas warns that divine value does not inhere in every 
legal rule. We ought not to be so rule-abiding, according to Aquinas, 
that we fail to bend human rules to meet emergencies that the legisla-
tor did not anticipate. 39 And we certainly need not obey human com-
mands that fail to conform to the basic rules of natural law~40 But . 
Aquinas does keep and explain a large measure of principled or for-
38. Aquinas says that the divine nature is the eternal law itself. Summa Theo/ogica, 1-11, 
Q 93, Art. 4. Because Christ is born of the Father, rather than made by God, He is also 
Himself the eternal law. ld at 2. 
39. Id at Q 96, Art~ 6. 
40. Id at Q 96, Art. 4. 
• 
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mal thinking, and so he is quite different from the radical skeptics, 
examined below, who attack all formal legal thought. 
There is a real spirituality connected to imaging, in law as else-
where. Participants in the Divine Liturgy realize the eschaton now-
rather than, say, spending Sunday morning trying by some instrumen-
tal calculus to hasten the future coming of the Kingdom of God on 
earth. Similarly, those who comply with just laws can rightly feel that 
they have imaged the common good at least as well as those who 
work instrumentally to achieve hoped-for future benefits. By imaging 
the prototype, the self (and its entire nexus of relationships) becomes 
part of an end in itself, rather than remaining only a means thereto.41 
The greatest power and ecstatic quality of this spiritual detach-
ment from results42 come when the effects of legal obedience are seem-
ingly disastrous for the self or even for the purposes for which the law 
was apparently enacted. Poignant examples may be found in the fa-
mous (and true) lifeboat-cannibalism cases.43 In the most commonly-
cited scenario, four men are dying of hunger and thirst, lost at sea in a 
lifeboat.44 .All four will perish before help can arrive if nothing is 
done. But if the three stronger ones overpower the already-weakened 
cabin boy, eat his ftesh and drink his blood, then those three will sur-
vive. Here the consequentialist or instrumentalist argument is that 
the sailors should violate rather than emulate the prototypical rule 
against killing, because the purpose of that rule is to preserve life and 
that purpose will now be furthered by killing. 
This problem could be seen to pose the issue of whether we may 
do evil to achieve good, but such a formulation would beg the ques-
tion for the three sailors might argue that an act is good if it pro-
duces good results. It would be fairer to ask whether the means 
should image the end. 
At least in a case like this that involves violently taking the life of 
a fellow human being (another iconic element),45 the Christian tradi-
tion is clear. A good tree bears good fruit. Our duty is faithfully to 
41. This self could be the answer to Roberto Unger's call for "concrete universality," the 
"power to infuse a universal significance into one's finite life." See Roberto Unger, Knowledge 
and Politics 224, 234 (Macmillan The Free Press, 1975, 1984). Unger himself reflects upon 
the problems of instrumentalism but does not reject it. 
42. Hindu spirituality is particularly strong here, in its adherence to duty regardless of 
consequences. See especially the classic Bhagvad-Gita (a lengthy religious meditation at the 
very climax of the epic Mahabharata). 
43. See generally A.W. Brian Simpson, Cannibalism and the Common Law (U Chicago 
Press, 1984 ). 
44. Regina v Dudley and Stephens, 14 QBD 273 (1884). 
45. See Richard Stith, Toward Freedom from Value, 38 The Jurist 48-81 (1978), where I 
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image the eternal good and then to trust God. God_ is able_ to produce 
good in this life, or in the next, from the _abnegation of will and of 
body required in order to accept starvation and dehydration~ Four 
deaths are simply not as great a harm as one murder even for the 
three sailors. Is it not the case, psychologically as ·well as metaphysi-
cally, that people become that which they image? To do violence even 
for a good purpose is still to become a violent person. Unless there is 
a change of heart, will ·not the next killing be easier? 
Image theory in the law as elsewhere is, however, vulnerable to 
two kinds of skepticism: doubt about the existence or dignity of the 
prototype, and doubt about the real link between the prototype and 
image. Nominalism and voluntarism are long-standing examples of 
such skepticism. Nominalism claims that only particulars exist, that 
there _are no prototypes. Similar images have only a nomen, a name in 
common; and this latter is only afla_tus vocis, a mere puff of the voice~ 
Voluntarism asserts that prototype, image, and any alleged link be-
tween the two originate in arbitrary acts of will. There is, therefore, 
no material way that an actor can imitate forms that have inherent 
worth. 
Much of modernity claims skeptically that ·nothing, no being and 
no relationship, is inherently good. Only experience and not reality 
exists, and only subjectively pleasurable experience is desirable 7 or, 
more accurately, is simply desired. This means that only experienced 
consequences; and not rules, ultimately matter. Tradition becomes 
mere laziness or stupidity, rather than a source of power, and the cult 
of originality is born. Image-based spirituality seems at best irra-
tional, and at worst a self-indulgent distraction from technical needs, 
rather than humankind's best hope to incarnate God upon the earth. 
A problem for s_uch consequentialism is that it is easy to show 
that one consequence of abolishing rule-imitation would be the experi-
ence of great unhappiness. Even if eating the cabin boy created more 
total future happiness for those involved in each particular case, such 
cannibalism would make future lifeboat relationships much more dif-
ficult.46 From the very first moment, cabin boys and others would 
need to defend themselves, with a good offense the best defense,, de-
argue for reverencing, rather than only valuing, human beings. Reverence prefer~ non-vio-
lence to preservation at aU costs., 
46. The nineteenth century London Times opined that it "would be dangerous to ... tell 
seafaring men that they may freely eat others in extreme circumstances, and that the cabin boy 
may be consumed if provisions run out." Simpson, Cannibalism and the Common Law at 216 
(cited in note 43)., 
., 
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spite the fact that full cooperation would be essential for group sur-
vival. So it would be instrumentally useful for all sailors to believe in 
the rule "do not kill innocent cabin boys under any circumstances." 
Consequentialism must admit the need for non-consequentialist rules. 
Yet consequentialism cannot by itself explain why these rules should 
be obeyed in concrete cases where it would be useful for them to be 
violated. Once cooperation has broken down (or no longer does any 
good) in the lifeboat, it becomes more useful to kill rather than to let 
live perhaps still proclaiming adherence to the general principle that 
killing is never permitted.47 Judges today are often in this predica-
ment. They know that rules are needed. But as their rules have no 
inherent value, they find it irrational to adhere to them when a change 
or exception seems useful. 
The Critical Legal Studies movement is more radical than! ordi-
nary consequentialism, claiming that all concepts, no matter how pro-
totypical they may appear; are purely instrumental.48 That is, they 
have whatever meaning is most politically or ideologically useful. 
Thus even the goal of making people experience happiness could 
mean only what each of us wanted it to mean. Even if concepts ex-
isted and had dignity, C.L.S. adherents argue, there would be abso-
lutely no way to go from general to particular. The concepts found in 
rules are inevitably so vague and contradictory that they can always 
be made to yield any result. For example, our boatmen could say that 
by failing to feast on the cabin boy they would have "killed" (by omis-
sion) three people, while to eat their companion was only to "assist" 
in an inevitable death caused not by them but by nature. Therefore, 
they could argue, they did not violate the rule against killing. 
Whether or not such an argument would be judicially accepted would 
depend, in the C.L.S. view, not on reason but on the judge's (or his 
legal culture's) conscious or unconscious ideological choices. All 
moral or legal reasoning from idea to instance becomes farcical. 
Yet, despite its powerful enemies, I predict that image theory will 
survive in law because the only alternative is simply violence, the rule 
of the strong. If icon theory, imaging, does not work, the alternative 
47. For an excellent survey of the difficulties which utilitarianism has with all rules, see 
Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good Indirectly, 95 Ethics 315-32 (1985). 
48. Roberto Unger's eady work, Knowledge and Politics, contains in my opinion by far 
the most profound critique of law by a member of the C.L.S. circle. A recent secondary source 
summarizing C.L.S. and comparing it to other legat philosophies isS. Prakash Sinha, What is 
Law? 201-16 (Paragon House, 1989). While C.L.S. situates itself on the political left, similar 
views from the right can be found, for example~ in Richard A. Posner, The Problems ofJuris-
prudence (Harvard U Press, 1990). 
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way to realize some good is always the force of events, the chain of 
causation over space and time. While in other areas of human en-
deavor force may be cooperative, in the law it is ,always antagonistic. 
Secular law exists to resolve conflicts. The result of saying that a case 
cannot be decided by prototypical principles adhered to by all is sim-
ply to leave the outcome up to the play of power and interest, includ-
ing, the powers and interests of judges. In the case of the lifeboat, the 
abandonment of ideas simply means that the boy will be eaten. Cabin 
boys will always be formalists. Only· those so powerful that they do 
not need protective principles can afford to be contemptuous of form. 
Image theory, then, is secretly a part not only of Christian tradi-
tion but also of legal thought. We are not trapped in formless instru-
mentality. There are ways in our own passing days to find and exult 
in the-incarnate good and holy. Both human experience and divine 
revelation tell us that there is dignity in becoming images. 
i 
